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Introduction 
At the beginning of 2018, the “two sessions” in China, Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs pointed out that the aim of China’s major-country diplomacy is to foster a new type of 
international relations, to build a global community with a shared future and to tell China story 
to foreign audiences (Xinhua, 2018). At the same time, the diplomatic claim of “creating a 
community of shared future for mankind”, officially considered as a value, has been writen in 
the introduction of China’s constitution. If this claim is the main aim of Chinese major-country 
diplomacy, the term of “tell China story, spread the voice of China” which, highlighted by Xi 
Jinping in the National Conference on Propaganda and Ideology in 2013, is regarded as the 
core theme of public diplomacy. According to Xi, China’s public diplomacy should to:  
“innovate the way of ‘dui wai xuan chuan’ (short term in Chinese: wai xuan, 
means external propaganda), create new concepts, new categories and 
new expressions which could be accepted by both in China and foreign 
countries, tell China’s stories well and spread Chinese voices well” (Xi, 2013).  
Although the concept of “public diplomacy” was introduced into China in recent years, 
it has already quickly developed into the “national strategy” of China’s foreign policy and 
occupied an increasingly meaningful position(Q. Zhao & Lei, 2015, p. 1). In China’s political 
and academic discourses, public diplomacy is serving China’s wai xuan strategy in conjunction 
with such practices as “cultural diplomacy”, “people’s diplomacy”, “international public 
relations” and “international communication and intercultural communication”. Within the 
party-state’s system, the term of “wai xuan” is one of the most common concepts, referring 
to China’s global image promotion, which shows the core practice and idea of China’s public 
diplomacy. Unlike the consensus achieved by international scholars who can be labeled as 
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belonging to a “moralist school of thought” that the notion of “propaganda” has a negative 
sense which refers to first a lack of pluralism of information sources for citizens. Then, 
propaganda means that the government censors information and promotes truncated or 
misleading presentations of political facts, or implement an institutionalized disinformation 
policy (Ollivier-Yaniv, 2010).  Chinese academia considers the term “xuan chuan (propaganda)” 
as “a positive connotation associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of 
the news, general shaping of ideology, or even advertisement or publicity” (Yiwei Wang, 2008, 
p. 259). Chinese scholars see public diplomacy as the essential process and practice of external 
propaganda which plays the role of China’s “international strategic communication” and 
“public relations”(Chen & Liu, 2015; Zhou, 2010). 
China has promoted the “equality, mutual trust, inclusiveness, mutual learning and 
mutually beneficial cooperation” (Hu, 2012) in its “Major-Country” diplomacy (Da guo wai jiao) 
to “forging a new form of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice, 
and win-win cooperation”(Xi, 2017). Even though several international critics might interpret 
this statement as the rhetorical expression of Chinese politicians, it nonetheless shows that 
Chinese party-state leaders have realized that China had already become an important 
country on the international scene and the promotion of this country’s image, reputation and 
statue seems to be the core practice to show Chinese soft power and “China’s dream” to its 
international audiences (Rabinovitch, 2008; Shambaugh, 2013; H. Wang, 1993). In fact, China’s 
public diplomacy is likely borrowed the French approach with a strong highlight of 
intercultural communication and influence, cultural exchange and diplomacy (McPhail, 2014, 
p. 75). Chinese scholars have also remarked the evolution of Chinese wai xuan from an 
“external propaganda” model to an “international spread of information” model which 
provides that its communicational actions focus more and more, on the one hand, on foreign 
audiences by using various media (traditional audio-visual media, social media, NGO, 
institutions, etc.) and flexible strategy in order to create a “two-way” communication and 
interaction between the Chinese government and its target public (Hartig, 2016, p.66); on the 
other, by expanding its national controlled Confucius Institute, China is “making use of the 
soft power of education” (Jeng-Yi, 2016, p. 425) in order to build a favorable relationships with 
its public and communicate and engage with its foreign public. 
The Ph.D. thesis investigates China’s Confucius Institute, its role, and its 
communicational practices in China’s public diplomacy. The study mainly focuses on Confucius 
Institutes in Africa because of its successful results (cf. the interview of with Hanban’s core 
officials). The thesis will discuss three sections: first, the conceptual framework section will 
argue the public diplomacy from a communication perspective, its definitions, approaches and 
practices. In French academia, the PD is considered principally as a political term, it is rarely 
being discussed in communication science. The first aim of this section is to “introduce” the 
concept of PD in French communication research filed. This Ph.D. dissertation will not 
presume to build a new public diplomacy theory; it intends to highlight the relationship and 
differences between public diplomacy and its associated concepts. It is indispensable to 
conceptualize public diplomacy further. Next, the dissertation will discuss the importance of 
the Chinese social dimension in its public diplomacy practice; this point will be addressed in 
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this discussion paper. Second, by showing briefly the empirical data collected from the 
Confucius Institute of the University of Nairobi and the Hanban, we plan to demonstrate the 
concrete practice of the Confucius Institute in daily communication and to confirm its position, 
strategy and effect serving to China’s public diplomacy. Third, this dissertation will also 
underline research method issues. During our investigation within China’s public institutions, 
we have met various limitations and difficulties, in this last part of the thesis, the investigation 
strategy, limitations and ethical issues will be focused.   
 
Conceptual framework – China’s public diplomacy 
The hybrid concept of public diplomacy is frequently mentioned in textbooks on 
political science, international relations and public relations. As an expression, public 
diplomacy is quoted all along politicians’ discourses and newspaper articles. Diplomatic 
communication practices are however varied and changing. Moreover, they contain a 
misleading ideological dimension. According to political science approaches, public diplomacy 
can be described as “one of the most salient political communication issues”(Snow & Taylor, 
2009, p. ix), and as a translation of political communication on the world stage (Hartig, 2016, 
p. 5) which participates in nation-states’ soft power consolidation (Keohane & Nye, 2012; 
Melissen, 2008; van Ham, 2008). Public diplomacy is further considered as “an instrument that 
governments use to mobilize soft power resources (culture of country, political ideology and 
policies) for communicating with and attracting the foreign publics” (Nye, 2008, p. 95). The 
most quoted definition of “public diplomacy” sees it as a strategic communication that intends 
to affect foreign publics’ thinking, and the attitude of their governments in the longer term 
(Malone, 1985, p. 199). The theorists of the cognitive analysis of public policies (in French: 
l’analyse cognitive de l’action publique) consider the exercise of public diplomacy as a process 
aimed to set and frame national thinking frameworks. The concept of référentiels for instance 
describes “a set of meanings that help understand and act” (Muller, 2014, p. 555). 
If Malone’s explanation on public diplomacy emphasizes its strategic goals, then Tuch 
clarifies the actor and contents of the strategy, he views the public diplomacy as that a 
government sends information to foreign publics for promoting its ideas, ideals, institutions 
and cultures and government’s policies and objectives in order to obtain a better 
understanding (Tuch, 1990, p. 3). The public diplomacy brings a set of discourses, images and 
practices together by which a government seek to influence the public opinion of foreign 
countries in a very gentle and hidden manner; as well as to manage the nation’s diplomatic 
environment and to enhance the Nation-State’s image on the international stage which 
implies developing mutual transcultural and transnational understanding. Public relations 
theorists find the similar goals and tools in public relations and public diplomacy, they 
conceptualize public diplomacy as “the way in which both government and private individuals 
and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear 
directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions” (Signitzer & Coombs, 1992, p. 138). 
By borrowing the competitive intelligence approaches, Zhong and Lu (2013, p. 543) argue that 
public diplomacy “involves relationship management and public relations tactics intended to 
effect change in foreign publics” to build a favorable political and social environment. 
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As public opinions play an increasingly essential role on the international stage, 
communication becomes a vital levier and medium of influence. Like Foucault (Foucault, 2013, 
p. 233) puts it, “to communicate is always a certain way of acting on the other and on the 
others,” and no matter how subtle, euphemistic or well-meaning this communication is, it 
remains a power relationship. Therefore, Huyghe emphasizes that “communication is an 
influence,” (Huyghe, 2008, p. 5) and the extent of influence is firstly achieved on the premise 
of attraction and sympathy. He points out that the influence is further to persuade, to 
promote social development, to shake the target public’s decision, to obtain a favorable policy 
behavior, and even to change the mind of an audience (ibid. pp.8-10). The official version of 
the public diplomacy definition proposed by the Chinese government directly reflects the 
essence of the governmental strategy for spreading international influence. First, public 
diplomacy focuses on the use of different angles to express and clarify the national conditions 
and national policies face to foreign audiences, the domestic governmental departments, 
corporates, NGOs, and the public are considered as the communicators. Second, public 
diplomacy concentrates on the explaining foreign countries’ incompatibility and 
misunderstanding, at the same time listening and communicating internationally.  Third, the 
purpose of listening is to understand other party’s viewpoints and opinions, and to reorganize 
the narrative in order to enhance the country’s image and improve the foreign public’s 
attitude and perception toward the country. The long-term objective is to affect international 
governments’ policies toward the country. 
The purpose of this part is to discuss the form and content of China’s public diplomacy. 
The importance of Chinese “relations” in public diplomacy practice will be highlighted. In the 
end, the goal of communication engagement in China’s public diplomacy will be sorted out. 
 
H1. The strategic latitude of China’s public diplomacy is fed by the concept of traditional 
Chinese philosophy to favor the “public-centric” model for establishing relationships as the 
precondition for communication. 
China’s public diplomacy blueprint, based on national scholars’ arguments, depends 
on the construction of cultural attraction as the main body, and then achieves the following 
goals: “promoting traditional culture and value and acting as a responsible great power on the 
world stage; advocating a harmonious world and Peaceful rise; demonstrating the virtues of 
the Chinese path of economic development; expanding its foreign assistance; and developing 
own discourse in world affairs.”(Yanhong Wang, 2006, pp. 134–140). Besides, the Chinese 
government is proud of the “people’s diplomacy” at the grass-roots level (Q. Zhao & Lei, 2015). 
“Personal diplomacy” at the elite level rely on people-to-people exchanges, scholarships, 
bilateral and multilateral cultural projects, and increasing contact, leads to build a “high level 
of trust” (Yu , 2009, pp. 10-11, 18), good relationships, and mutual understanding. 
In fact, public diplomacy has always been guided by the strategy to achieve the 
influence goals of a country, especially in the context of globalization. As Melissen pointed out 
the “new” public diplomacy, “building relationships with civil society actors in other countries 
and about facilitating networks between non-governmental parties at home and aboard. (…)In 
order to safeguard their interests in a globalized world, countries need  ‘permanent friends’ 
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in other nations”(Melissen, 2008, pp. 22–23). The relationship building, and management are 
particularly important in China’s public diplomacy practice, as the White Paper published by 
China’s State Council, China’s peaceful development relies on “the dialogue and exchanges 
among civilizations; (…) in-depth exchanges and cooperation with parliaments, political 
parties, localities, and civil society in various countries; expansion of exchanges in the 
humanities field; mutual understanding and friendship building between international public 
and Chinese people” (Information Office of the State Council, 2011). The “people to people 
model” communication reflects not only in the strategic inclination of China’s public 
diplomacy, but also represents the Chinese “relationalism” in diplomatic communication 
practices. 
As Zaharna argues: “the relational constellation shapes communication for all 
individuals” (Zaharna, 2018, p. 321). China’s public diplomacy is based on a “relations-as-
communication” model which stresses relational structure before the influence 
implementation (ibid, p. 321). Most of the traditional Chinese ideas focus on tactics to 
influence people’s way of thinking in given social context. Chinese Confucian idea and social 
practice of “guanxi” (relation) could be mobilized to analyze Chinese public diplomatic 
communication. As China’s initial social structure is based on a “differential mode of 
association” (chaxu geju), that means the society basically “composed of distinctive networks 
spreading out from each individual's personal connections”(Fei, Hamilton, & Wang, 1992, p. 
71). This special character of “rural” (ibid, p.37) also reflected in the system of Chinese 
Confucian philosophy. 
The Chinese “guanxi” equals to five similar attributes:  1) the subjects of the guanxi 
share a group status; 2) the subjects of the guanxi has common acquaintance; 3) the subjects 
of the guanxi remain interaction frequently or infrequently; 4) the common background (job, 
education, family, etc.); 5) the common topics (interests, hobbies, lifestyle, etc.) (Tsui & Farh, 
1997). In Confucianism, people are fundamentally considered as social or relational beings. 
China’s idiomatic expression could explain this relation: “everyone has cousin three thousand 
miles away”, it shows that the Chinese people’s relationship network is like a “spider web.” It 
is at the center of its own and people-to-people connections are continually spreading. The 
frequent contacts and exchanges are called as the cornerstone of strengthening the 
relationship. The construction of guanxi could be seen as a process of mutual relation and 
trust building: firstly, the connection is established on the basis of friendship, and then, this 
type of relationship is potentially based on mutual benefits, and an expectation of reciprocity 
(Hwang, 1987; Tsui et al., 2000, p. 231).  
In Chinese society, the “guanxi” often associated with “renqing”, if “guanxi” includes 
a system of interpersonal exchange of service or a favor (Liu & Boutin, 2013, p. 127) and a 
system of emotional dependence between each part of relations. The term “renqing” refers 
to a form of “social capital” that could be considered as a balance for interpersonal exchanges 
of services and favors. Hwang describes that “renqing” could not be calculated objectively, as 
well as the “guanxi” and “renqing” interact each every, when a Chinese uses its “guanxi” 
(relations or networks) to ask a favor, he must repay in this favor for restoring the balance in 
relationships. 
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“Guanxi” is described as a participatory and interactive process in interpersonal 
communication, this idea seems further to be integrated in China’s people to people 
communication practice in public diplomacy. Like Chen and Liu say in their research paper on 
Chinese public diplomacy strategy: “the diffusion of cultures and values must be integrated 
into social life and create direct communication with the intended audience, so that people at 
the grass-roots level can perceive and understand” (page 25). The preliminary of Chinese 
public diplomacy is to establish close guanxi (relationship) with “foreign citizens (grass-roots), 
people who are interested in Chinese issues, opinion leaders, social elites and political elites” 
(Chen & Liu, 2015, pp. 29–31). 
H2. The process of China’s public diplomacy in the Confucius Institute is also the network 
process of constructing and reconstructing strategic narratives. 
While public diplomacy regards the foreign public as a target of influence, and it is 
considered as the main channel of the nation-State’s soft power resources diffusion, its 
process shows the characteristics of strategic communication. In an unrestrained sense, 
strategic communication was broadly defined as communication activities that allow 
organizations to reach their objectives(Hallahan, Holtzhausen, van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 
2007, pp. 3–4). In practice, it encompasses “coordinated actions, messages, images, and other 
forms of signaling or engagement intended to inform, influence, or persuade target audiences 
in support of national objectives” (Paul, 2011, p. 3). To summarize, three aspects of strategic 
communication could be detected: 1) connecting with information or knowledge; 2) practicing 
communication and bringing influence; 3) political participation. French competitive scholar, 
François-Bernard Huyghe identifies five national communication strategies in public 
diplomacy process (Huyghe, 2010, pp. 103–108): 1) a fortress strategy to prevent information 
breaches to keep high-value information secure; 2) a strategy based on propaganda and 
personal believes as crucial factors of mobilization; 3) a strategy based on image framing 
through the worldwide promotion of a given cultural model more basically said of a given way 
of life; 4) a vector strategy which focuses on strengthening both new and old ‘channels’ of 
communication; 5) the access strategy that focuses on the profusion of messages. 
Most of the Chinese philosophy emphasizes the tactics to influence the consciousness 
and the human brain. It involves various strategic deployments applied to communication as 
well as is reflected in the Confucius Institute’s public diplomacy services. In “The Art of War”,  
Sun Zi underlines “hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; 
supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting”(Sun, 2000, 
p. 8). The war theorist points out that the influence on the thoughts, brain, and emotions of 
the enemy is far greater than the conquest of force itself in most wars. The moral restructuring 
shaping (Jullien, 2010, p. 41) allows achieving strategic goals by influencing the “mind” of 
enemies. Sun Zi underlines as well, in the traditional Chinese culture, the strategic value of the 
balance between “indirect” and “direct”, “roundabout” and “access”: “Thus, to take a long 
and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, 
to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation”(Sun, 
2000, p. 25). Sun Zi’s warfare philosophy uses the strategies of “indirect influence” in the field 
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of strategic communication and the efforts to influence through long-term strategic, 
persuasive narratives. 
Nye proposed “international affairs has become a matter of ‘whose story 
wins’”(Roselle, Miskimmon, & O’Loughlin, 2014, p. 71). The importance of storytelling is self-
evident in public diplomacy. With the diversification of communication methods, new public 
diplomacy practices have increasingly emphasized: “two-way communication such as cultural 
and educational exchanges”(J. Wang, 2006, p. 94). The network communication approach has 
further strengthened the exchange of information in the process of public diplomacy 
communication, allowed the co-created content practice, and create the soft power through 
organizational communication achievement (Zaharna, Hubbert, & Hartig, 2014, p. 12). China’s 
new diplomatic blueprint proposed by Xi Jinping highlights the necessary of storytelling and 
public participation for creating a harmony relation that Chinese scholars consider as 
constructing an ecosystem between organization – publics – environment (political, 
diplomatic, economic, social, cultural, natural and technological contexts) (Chen, 2004, p.37). 
This ecosystem could conclusively establish relationships with foreign publics, strengthen the 
country’s image by communicating its ideology on the international stage and influence target 
publics subtly. The core of this strategy is to reach some certain common interests with the 
target audience. In practice, the procedure includes the formulation of language elements, 
storytelling, the valorization of the national heritages, the communication of great stories of 
origins, the propaganda in the sense of a controlled diffusion of images and clichés, the 
organization and mobilization of interpersonal links, the development of exchange programs. 
It, therefore, requires working in a long-term perspective. This activity motivates the audience 
to change from a passive message receiver to an active co-creator of information and is 
affected subtly in participation. 
 
Implantation of strategic and social aspects in China’s public diplomacy: towards a global 
communication engagement?  
Today’s public diplomacy practice is gradually strengthening “building relationships” 
and “telling stories” in order to reinforce public engagement in the communication practices. 
In fact, many Western scholars (Fisher & Lucas, 2011; Fitzpatrick, Fullerton, & Kendrick, 2013; 
Zaharna, 2018) have outlined the close relationship between “public diplomacy” and 
“engagement”. They even complement each other and transform each other in the exercise 
of communication. Since the economic reform in 1978, China has been actively strengthening 
the legitimacy of the Communist Party as the ruler of China’s central government (d’Hooghe, 
2005, p. 93). It looks forward to seeking the global understanding of its political systems and 
policies in order to create a favorable international perception and positive global image 
through the efforts of public diplomacy, at the same time, the government intends to reduce 
the traces of “the government’s excessive lead to external communication and propaganda” 
in its public diplomacy. To this end, the Chinese government has put forward the principle of 
“qu mi zeng mei” (our translation: excluding secrets and increasing charm) in public diplomacy 
practice, namely, strengthening information disclosure, telling policies in plain language, 
emphasizing two-way communication and enhancing China’s image. In addition, the 
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government and scholars have also proposed to develop China’s multi-track diplomacy (L. 
Wang, 2018) to develop the engagement of both Chinese and international public: except the 
government-government diplomacy, the Chinese government promotes think-tank diplomacy, 
corporate diplomacy and NGO diplomacy under its international cooperation framework on 
the one hand, on the other, the “people to people” model in “non-governmental 
communications” has  been actively mobilized by China(L. Zhao & Huang, 2015, p. 250). 
As Zaharna (2018) has confirmed, China’s public diplomacy has not only emerged from 
a purely individual model or a relational model but can also be described as a holistic and 
networked strategic model. This model requests preexisted complex interpersonal relations, 
so to say, engagement relies on relationship networks and is based on the assumption that 
relation building equals to communication. “The relational structure is based on inherent 
connections to others (rather than separate individuals), engagement in the holistic logic 
includes the features of the relational logic (contact, nonverbal communication, emotion, 
perspective-taking, and symbolism), plus additional ones”(Zaharna, 2018, p. 321). As Chinese 
public relations scholars underlined, in the oriental culture, people consider society as the 
reference background. Being a kind of social resource, the relationship building and 
maintenance are crucial to “reinforce the emotion of each every and to pursuit the harmony 
of people”(Chen, 2004, p. 38). The long-term relationship building is more important than 
communication and influence. Strategically, through a various storytelling and continuous 
search for intercultural or interpersonal common grounds, the mutual relations, mutual 
understanding and recognition with the target audience will be established, the common 
interests will as well be found. This process may change the opinion, perception, and attitude 
of global publics during a long-term influence. 
In the public diplomacy process of the Confucius Institute led by the Chinese 
government, the “people-to-people” model has become the flagship of China’s global 
communication engagement. This model could be seen as a form of global strategic 
communication that could be endorsed by organizations mandated to do so and to work 
within the constrained framework of one country’s public diplomacy, this interconnected 
communication and relation form has relied on the subtlest model of soft power to achieve 
national diplomatic goals. The dynamism of so-called people to people activities of public 
diplomacy stems from significant investments which as well “reflect in this respect the 
challenge of influencing strategies in contemporary security policies” (Heller & Persson, 2009, 
p. 246; Pahlavi, 2013, p. 564). The people to people model of public diplomacy seems to be 
another form of track-II diplomacy that actors from one country’s civil society aim to interact, 
seduce and influence consciously or unconsciously citizens of foreign nations and defending 
and/or promoting their proper national interests.  
 
Preliminary findings: the case study in Confucius Institutes 
As a Chinese language teaching institution supported by the Chinese government, the 
Confucius Institute has a tight network structure which facilitates the exchange of information 
and the implementation of a strategic narrative.  
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1. The organizational structure of the Confucius Institute facilitates the engagement of its 
employees and collaborators as stakeholders.  
The objectives of funding Confucius Institute are to internationalize Chinese culture, 
promote inter-social and intercultural understanding and initiate educational cooperation 
with foreign countries (Kurlantzick, 2007; Lo & Pan, 2014, p. 512; Ministère de l’éducation de 
la République populaire de Chine, 2013). Indeed, all Confucius Institutes are run by the 
Confucius Institute Headquarters – known as Hanban, which under the direct financial and 
managerial umbrella of the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China. Hanban’s 
chair, Liu Yandong, member of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo since 2007, is former 
official on the ideological and propaganda missions for the “united front”.  
In 2004, Hanban established its first educational institution abroad named Confucius 
Institute in Seoul.In fact, the Chinese language and culture promotion platform is made up of 
two different poles: the training centers located in foreign universities are labeled as 
“Confucius Institute” for the college students and adults; the language laboratories in primary 
and secondary schools are labeled as “Confucius Classroom”. In only 13 years, Hanban has 
opened 525 Confucius Institutes and 1,113 primary and secondary Confucius Classrooms had 
been established in 146 countries and regions. 
The rapid development benefits from its unique Sino-foreign cooperative 
organizational model and the backing of the massive resources of the Chinese government 
behind it: the foreign branches of Confucius Institute are almost always built in partnership 
between a Chinese university and a foreign university. The institution usually located in a 
foreign university or public school and it uses the host institution’s material, immaterial and 
human resources: classrooms, offices, college housing for teachers, administrative staff, etc. 
Host institutions commonly receive a grant from the Chinese government of between 
$ 100,000 and $ 150,000 per year for a 3-to-5-years-incubation period until the new-built 
institute has the auto-financing ability (Hubbert, 2014; Starr, 2009). Besides, Hanban also 
provides human resources (full-time teachers, part-time teaching volunteers) and educational 
resources (pedagogical materials, audiovisual contents, etc.) to facilitate the development of 
its foreign branches. New recruited Chinese teachers are necessary to participate in a 
particular training program proposed by Hanban for a period of 3 – 6 months. This program 
includes not only pedagogical courses but also communication techniques and ideological 
contents. Besides, the daily management of Confucius Institute is entirely in line with the Sino-
foreign cooperation, namely the Chinese director chosen by the Hanban and the Chinese 
University who collaborates with the local director for pedagogical affairs, administrative and 
cultural activities, social and international as well as intercultural communication. The Chinese 
teachers’ management in the overseas Confucius Institutes adopts a “collective life” approach, 
in which Chinese nationality teachers live in the same community and have a strict 
management system in their daily lives. In addition, the Confucius Institutes hold a variety of 
team building activities to enhance teamwork, members' feelings and connections. This 
“Chinese-style” approach to group life will also affect daily work and affect foreign colleagues. 
 
2. The daily teaching process as a process of strategic narrative  
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Overseas Confucius Institutes often form a working network with other Chinese-
funded agencies and embassies in the countries to conduct China’s public diplomacy. The data 
in this part issues mainly from the first phase of our fieldwork study in the Confucius Institute 
at the University of Nairobi between March and April 2018 and the second phase of our query 
at the Hanban in Beijing between June and July 2018.  
The overseas Confucius Institute primarily considers five aspects of the strategic 
narrative. 1) Attributing different image and roles for Confucius Institute teachers for the 
relationship-building; 2) Cleverly designing messages, seeking common ground while 
reserving differences, and changing the attitude of the target audience through long-term 
daily communication; 3) Organizing rich and diverse cultural and recreational activities; 4) 
Through the network in between Confucius Institutes, Chinese Embassies and local Chinese-
funded enterprises, they provide scholarships and local employment opportunities for local 
students; 5) Organizing “excellent students” and “elite students” to visit and study in China to 
enhance the impact. By organizing a series of shared activities, Confucius Institutes expect to 
establish a shared emotion and intimate relationship with their target audience, and then 
maintain relationships as well as integrate and affect different individuals through daily 
communication and strategic message penetration. 
 
Further research 
By showing the first feedback from the fieldwork at the Confucius Institute at the 
University of Nairobi in Kenya and the Confucius Institute Headquarters, we discover that The 
Chinese government used the Confucius Institute’s practice of public diplomacy to re-enable 
the communication logic led by “relationship building” – “network construction” – “global 
engagement”. Its purpose is to establish good relations with ordinary people in the country 
through the “people-to-people” model of public diplomacy. Based on the literature review 
and the first empirical findings, we formulated the concept of “people to people” model of 
public diplomacy. The practice so-called “people to people” public diplomacy is not destined 
to affecting political decision-making. It is more like an influence mechanism of voters’ 
attitudes. It happens during the daily life, as an interpersonal communication and two-way 
communication model, the actors are trying to manage and hold a good relationship with their 
audiences, based on establishing a maximum consensus, by using informational penetration, 
cultural attraction and influence at the long-term, in order to change the audience’s attitudes 
and opinions on some issues so as to serve the public diplomacy strategies of the country 
represented by the actors. 
In the next step, we will follow the “summer camp” of African Confucius Institute 
students in Shanghai, we intend to observe this special summer camp in order to discover how 
the Chinese government organizes the visit for African students and how it communicates 
with these students intensively for 15 days, this observation allows to understand how the 
Chinese government has “secondary influence” on overseas visiting students in China. 
 
 
Ethical issues of the fieldwork study 
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According to the negotiation of the communication contract, all staff interviewed at 
the Confucius Institute in Nairobi and the Confucius Institute Headquarters have agreed to be 
quoted by name in the context of my Ph.D. dissertation in France. When I publish scientific 
articles and communicates during conferences, I have chosen to anonymize the quotations 
and to designate each interviewee by a code. This problematic choice comes from an 
epistemological and ethical reflection on my relationship to the fieldwork study.  
First, my fieldwork and research happened in the Chinese public institutions, because 
of the strict censorship, in order to obtain research permission, I am not able to put all my 
inspection intentions and plans out; Second, the interviewees could have accepted my 
interview request as one of their former contacts in China; Third, I have socialized with all 
interviewees who live in the local community, and they have given me rich gray information .  
I also wanted to preserve critical interviewees who allowed me to access this field of 
investigation with a favorable bias (former teachers, former contacts). I cannot ignore the fact 
that the critical dimension of my research could have been difficult to conceptualize for my 
interlocutors. 
 
During this Ph.D. seminar, we are waiting for your remarks and feedback on our 
theoretical framework concerning the mix of (new) public diplomacy, soft power, strategic 
communication, Chinese characteristics of communication. According to you, which part has 
to be improved? What kinds of other concepts have to be considered?  Furthermore, we hope 
that you can give us some advice on the field-work strategy, especially about the ethical issues 
of field research. In fact, our third and last phase of fieldwork has already planned by the end 
of 2018, for interviewing in China’s educational institutions. We are wondering how we can 
get more useful information during our empirical research? And what kind of survey methods 
could be more practical and useful in public relations research? We really would like to 
exchange all of these questions with you. 
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